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After considering the background to the G20 summit meetings after the recent global 
economic and financial crisis, this paper aims to identify the trade agenda that 
represents Asia’s concerns for the global and regional trading system. Asia, in particular 
East Asia, has played an important role in evolving the global production and trade 
networks. The regional production network in East Asia became the major transmission 
mechanism of the crisis, resulting in a trade collapse, but Asia experienced a relatively 
quick rebound, demonstrating that its network was not derailed. Asian economies have 
also shifted their policy focus from multilateralism to regionalism, even though there are 
several challenges such as underuse and a shallowness of their regional trade 
agreements. This paper recommends that the Seoul Summit seek tangible results on 
resolving the stalemate of the Doha Development Agenda to strengthen the credibility of 
G20, integrate individual free trade agreements into broader regional trade agreements, 
and link the development agenda to trade. 
 
 
Keywords: global governance and Group of Twenty (G20), international and regional 
trade, global and regional production networks, global and regional trade systems 
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1.   Introduction 
 
In an era of globalization, the recent global economic and financial crisis, which 
originated in the United States (US) in 2008, spread to Asian economies. This 
transmission was partly because Asian economies are heavily dependent on markets of 
the US and Europe. Most economies in Asia, particularly those in East Asia, had 
adopted outward-looking trade policies for their industrialization, and the key 
destinations for their exports are the US and Europe; hence, the crisis there significantly 
reduced their demand for commodities produced in Asia, undermining the export 
performances of Asian economies.   
 
The global production network was another channel through which the crisis spread to 
Asian economies, as they have been closely linked to the global value chain since the 
1990s (discussed in Section II). When the crisis hit this network, Asia started to be 
damaged. 
 
In an effort to recover quickly from the crisis, major countries formed the “G20 summit” 
and made efforts to discuss and set a policy agenda in a sincere and cooperative 
manner. During the four rounds of the G20 summit meetings,
1  G20 leaders tried to move 
the global economy beyond the crisis to a path of sustained and balanced growth. These 
meetings provided mutually agreed outcomes, including identification of key principles 
for financial market reform;
2 commitment to a standstill on protectionism; efforts to 
restore economic growth and employment recovery (US$ 5 trillion to be spent to 
stimulate growth by the end of 2010); reform and reinforcement of financial supervision 
and regulations; exit strategies to be taken under international collaboration once 
economic recovery is certain; agreement on principles for fiscal consolidation by 




At the G20 Pittsburgh Summit, countries designated the Republic of Korea as the host 
country for the fifth G20 summit in November 2010. The Seoul Summit is the first G20 
summit meeting hosted by an Asian and emerging country, providing opportunities for 
reflecting Asia’s own views on the agenda. 
 
                                                       
1  Washington, DC, United States (15–16 November 2008); London, United Kingdom (2–3 April 2009); 
Pittsburgh, United States (24–25 September 2009); and Toronto, Canada (26–27 June 2010). 
2  These principles are reinforcement of transparency and a sense of responsibility; improvement of 
financial supervision and regulations; enhancement of the reliability of financial markets; reinforcement 
of international cooperation; and reform of international financial organizations. See Declaration: 
Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (15 November 2008) for more information. 
3  See Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (15 November 2008); The 
Global Plan for Recovery and Reform (2 April 2009); Leaders’ Statement: The Pittsburgh Summit; and 
The G20 Toronto Summit: Declaration for more information.  
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Having outlined the background of the G20 summit meetings, this paper aims to identify 
the trade agenda that represents Asia’s concerns for the global and regional trading 
system. It aims to design a consistent and concrete regional agenda that G20 Asian 
members can bring to the global decision-making table. Up to the fourth Summit, 
member countries had focused on macroeconomic and financial issues, even though 
some trade issues, such as commitment to a standstill on protectionism
4 and avoiding 
protectionism and promoting international trade,
5 were discussed. However, since most 
developing countries consider international trade as a vital tool for industrialization and 
economic development, the G20 Seoul Summit emphasized trade issues. 
 
To meet this aim, this paper evaluates the importance of global and regional production 
and trade networks, and the concrete steps to link the global and regional trading 
systems in Section II. Section III discusses the impact of the crisis on regional trade 
networks and consequently on emerging Asia’s economies. Section IV assesses the 
development status of global and regional trade systems from the Asian perspective. 
Finally, Section V discusses specific policy suggestions and areas of cooperation that 
emerging Asia could highlight on the G20 agenda. 
 
 
2.   Recent Developments in Global and Regional Production 
and Trade Networks in Asia 
 
2.1.    Asia’s Role in the Global Production and Trade Network 
 
The global production network—which entails fragmenting the production process into 
geographically separated, low-cost destinations—has kept evolving over the past three 
decades. It has widened and deepened. Starting from simple electronics and clothing 
industries, global production networks spread horizontally to, for example, footwear, 
automobiles, office equipment, cameras, and publishing. This fragmentation also 
expanded vertically, to include customer services, legal services, R&D activities, and 
human resources.   
 
The globally integrated production network has led to the formation of a global trade 
network for countries to trade intermediate and final goods as well as services. Most 
multinational corporations have tried to establish their own network of supplying 
intermediate goods and services from their own branches or their partners in various 
countries. 
 
Given these trends, trade volumes in the “triad” of North America, Europe, and East Asia 
have significantly increased since the 1990s, via the formations of intra- and 
interregional trade networks. In 2009, the European Union accounted for 35.1%, East 
Asia
6  26.3%, and North America 12.8% of world exports, recording 74.2% in total.   
                                                       
4  See Declaration: Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (15 November 2008) for more 
information. 
5  See The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform (2 April 2009) for more information. 
6  In this paper, East Asia refers to 10 economies in East and Southeast Asia: People’s Republic of China;  
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Asia, in particular East Asia, has played an important role in evolving the global 
production and trade networks. As shown in Figure 1, the volume of East Asian exports 
increased from 1990, even though it significantly fell in 2009 due to the crisis. Its share 
of exports also increased, from 18.4% in 1990, even after the crisis, recording 26.3% in 
2009.  
 
As shown in Athukorala (2009, 2010), Kang et al. (2010), Kim, Lee, and Park (2010), 
and Wakasugi et al. (2008), as part of global production networks, economies in East 
Asia are linked more closely to one another than economies in any other region. Its 





Figure 1: Recent Trend of East Asian Exports and Share in World Exports 
(US$ million, %) 
 
 







                                                                                                                                                               
Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the Philippines; Singapore; 
Thailand; and Viet Nam. Each of them exported more than US$ 50 billion in 2009, for a total of US$ 3.4 
trillion. India is also one of Asia’s key exporters, but we exclude it to focus on East Asia. Taipei,China is 
obviously one of the most important players, but is not included because the Direction of Trade 
Statistics (DOTS) does not cover its data.  
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Figure 2: Recent Trend of Intraregional Export in East Asia 
(US$ million, %) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund.   
 
 
2.2.    Asia’s Regional Production and Trade Network 
 
East Asia’s intraregional trade network is different from that of the other triad regions. 
While both North America and Europe have been developing their networks by forming 
an institutional framework, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the European Union (EU), East Asia’s network is a market-driven or functional 
economic integration.   
 
Hong Kong, China has the greatest share of intraregional exports (as a proportion of its 
total exports) among the 10 East Asian economies, at 72.4% in 2009, followed by 
Indonesia (66.1%), Malaysia (63.2%), Viet  Nam (60.5%), the Philippines (59.5%), 
Thailand (52.7%), Singapore (48.7%), the Republic of Korea (44.0%), Japan (39.4%), 
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, 34.6%). Using regional trade and production 
networks in East Asia, these economies produce and export intermediate goods to the 
PRC—the main “factory” in the region—and then the PRC assembles and exports final 
goods to countries all over the world. The main destinations of these exports are the US 
and Europe—as explored in Ando and Kimura (2009) and Kim, Lee, and Park (2010)—
implying a vulnerable channel through which the recent crisis spread from these regions. 
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The Asian Input-Output Table 2000 from the Institute of Developing Economies and the 
Japan External Trade Organization (2006) enables us to analyze East Asia’s regional 
production network and services offshoring. Tables 1 and 2 show flows of material and 
services inputs in selected economies of East Asia and in the US,
7 in  2000.
8  As found in 
Kang et al. (2010), each country has been supplied with a large share of materials and 
services from its own economy.   
 
Both Japan and the US have been one of top three providers of material and services 
inputs into all economies’ supply chain.
9 As concluded in Kang et al. (2010), Japan, the 
US, the PRC, and the Republic of Korea are the main suppliers of material and services 
inputs in East Asia. 
 
Again as shown in Kang et al. (2010), firms in East Asia have tried to use the most 
efficient material and services inputs within the regional production network, rather than 
in their home country, leading East Asia as a whole to enhance its productivity. Kang et 
al. (2010) also showed that the productivity impact of services offshoring in East Asia 
was greater than that in the US, suggesting a strong motivation for strengthening and 
deepening the network. 
 
 
3.  Impact of the Global Economic and Financial Crisis on the 
Regional Production and Trade Network in Asia 
 
3.1.    Trade Collapse after the Crisis 
 
The recent crisis was triggered by a credit crunch in the US, due to the burst of the 
housing bubble, the subprime mortgage problem, and the collapse of the shadow 
banking system.
10 It was deepened by consecutive risks in other countries, such as the 
sovereign debt crisis of some eurozone countries. The impact of the crisis on 
international trade was very great—a “trade collapse” in the words of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2010). As shown in Figure 3, 
global export volume in 2009 fell by 22.0%. This trade collapse triggered concerns for 
international trade, including worries about protectionism. 
 
 
                                                       
7  We included the United States to analyze regional production network and services offshoring in East 
Asia because it plays an important role in this regional network. 
8  Data for 2000 are the most recent from the Institute of Developing Economies and the Japan External 
Trade Organization. However, after analyzing trends of flows of material and services inputs in this 
region in 1990, 1995, and 2000, as Kang et al. (2010) have already done, one finds that East Asia’s 
regional production and trade networks have deepened and widened. Therefore, these networks are 
stronger than what these two tables show. 
9  Unfortunately, we did not have any relevant data on European countries to determine their roles in East 
Asia’s regional production and trade networks. We leave it for future research. 
10  The shadow banking system provides channels of funds from investors to businesses, consisting of 
nonbank financial institutions. Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers are good examples.  
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Table 1: Flows of Material Inputs in Selected Economies in East Asia, 2000 
(US$ million) 
 
Country PRC  Indonesia Japan  KOR  Malaysia Philippines Singapore  Thailand
PRC 1,041,693  864  12,281  5,365 1,871  480  2,595  2,186 
88.02% 1.37%  0.67%  1.45% 2.07% 1.32%  3.28%  2.50% 
Indonesia   1,794  44,230  3,893 1,328  1,252  417  1,311  861 
0.15% 70.17%  0.21%  0.36% 1.39% 1.15%  1.66%  0.99% 
Japan 23,718  2,800  1,693,870 18,918 10,335  4,315  10,278  9,025 
2.00% 4.44% 92.49% 5.12%  11.45% 11.89% 13.00%  10.33% 
Korea, 
Republic of 
18,157 1,347  11,594  289,664  2,789 1,849  2,024  1,775 
1.53% 2.14%  0.63% 78.46%  3.09% 5.09%  2.56%  2.03% 
Malaysia 3,693  685  5,305  2,468 35,060  917  6,322  2,130 
0.31% 1.09%  0.29%  0.67%  38.85% 2.53% 8.00%  2.44% 
Philippines 824  40  2,116 838  1,210  15,695  186  355 
0.07% 0.06%  0.12%  0.23% 1.34% 43.24%  0.24% 0.41% 
Singapore 3,444 656  2,098 2,068 9,298  1,731  26,385 2,125 
0.29% 1.04%  0.11%  0.56%  10.30% 4.77% 33.38%  2.43% 
Thailand 2,351  450  4,784  1,023 2,774  655  1,857 50,596 
0.20% 0.71%  0.26%  0.28% 3.07% 1.80%  2.35%  57.93% 
US 11,160  1,585  25,836  16,207 8,062  2,964  6,548  3,811 
0.94% 2.51%  1.41%  4.39% 8.93% 8.17%  8.28%  4.36% 
ROW 
59,526 9,693  60,137 28,183  14,103 6,095  19,932  12,647 
5.03% 15.38%  3.28%  7.63% 15.63% 16.79% 25.21%  14.48% 
 
Notes: KOR = the Republic of Korea; PRC = the People’s Republic of China; ROW = rest of the world; US = United 
States. 
1. Each data point shows the volume of input flows from the country in the column to the country in the row. 2. From the 
perspective of the country in the rows, the shaded areas are the top three suppliers to that country (excepting the 
country’s own inputs).   
Source: Recalculation and reproduction from Kang et al. (2010) using Asian International Input-Output Table, Institute of 
Developing Economies and Japan External Trade Organization (2006). 
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Table 2: Flows of Services Inputs in Selected Economies in East Asia, 2000 
(US$ million) 
 
Country PRC  Indonesia  Japan KOR  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand 
PRC 372,578  101  2,073  922 196  61  248 230 
96.26%  0.21% 0.12% 0.46% 0.51% 0.26% 0.31% 0.53% 
Indonesia  372  41,484  835 206 205  62  40  151 
0.10% 86.58% 0.05%  0.10%  0.53% 0.27% 0.05% 0.35% 
Japan 3,204  348  1,642,753  2,137  2,085  366 979 997 
0.83%  0.73% 96.34% 1.07%  5.40% 1.58% 1.24% 2.29% 
Korea, 
Republic of 
863  60  503 173,460 179  69  75  79 
0.22% 0.13% 0.03%  86.89%  0.46% 0.30% 0.09% 0.18% 
Malaysia 175  37  736  114 26,892  44  2,396  104 
0.05% 0.08% 0.04% 0.06%  69.62%  0.19% 3.03% 0.24% 
Philippines  205 11 560  188  218  19,004  41  98 
0.05% 0.02% 0.03% 0.09% 0.56% 82.09% 0.05%  0.23% 
Singapore  207 129 154 126 568  98  58,213  162 
0.05% 0.27% 0.01% 0.06% 1.47%  0.42% 73.53% 0.37% 
Thailand  298 76 498 99 374 58 155  40,750 
0.08% 0.16% 0.03% 0.05% 0.97% 0.25% 0.20%  93.75% 
US  1921 277 7,343  2,558  1,692 450 1,084 606 
0.50% 0.58% 0.43% 1.28% 4.38% 1.94% 1.37% 1.39% 
ROW 5,132  5,304  49,027  19,581 5,539  2,816 15,785  84 
1.33% 11.07% 2.88%  9.81% 14.34% 12.16% 19.94%  0.19% 
 
Notes: KOR = the Republic of Korea; PRC = the People’s Republic of China; ROW = rest of the world; US = United States. 
1. Each data point shows the volume of input flows from the country in the column to the country in the row. 2. From the 
perspective of the country in the rows, the shaded areas are the top three suppliers to the country (excepting the country’s own 
inputs).  
 
Source: Recalculation and reproduction from Kang et al. (2010) using Asian International Input-Output Table, Institute of 
Developing Economies and Japan External Trade Organization (2006). 
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   Source:  Direction  of  Trade  Statistics, International Monetary Fund.   
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The crisis hit the export performance of East Asia (Figure 4). In 2009, the Philippines’ 
exports dropped by 28.0%, followed by Indonesia (23.5%), Japan (22.6%), Malaysia 
(19.1%), the Republic of Korea (16.2%), the PRC (14.4%), Thailand (12.5%), Viet Nam 
(12.3%), and Hong Kong, China (8.6%), while Singapore’s exports increased by 1.7%. 
 
The OECD (2010) identifies three main reasons for the trade collapse: (1) a collapse in 
demand; (2) a shortage of short-term trade finance; and (3) compositional factors related 
to a disproportionate fall in output and trade of goods that make up a larger share of 
trade than of GDP. The crisis led the global economy to experience a collapse in 
demand for export goods, which in turn led the exporters to reduce their production and 
exports. As discussed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010), since manufactured goods are 
more cyclical than non-manufactured goods, the uncertainty of future economic 
prospects and the credit crunch heavily affected demand for them. In addition, the credit 
crunch also reduced access to trade finance, as discussed in OECD (2010) and Auboin 
and Meier-Ewert (2003). But there is no evidence that protectionist measures after the 
crisis were a major factor in the trade collapse, as shown in OECD (2010), even though 
the risk of protectionism is still a major concern. 
 
Ironically, regional production networks in East Asia—having been at the heart of the 
growth in trade among East Asian economies—became the major transmission 
mechanism of the crisis. Since trade in parts and components expanded more rapidly 
than that in final goods in East Asia, the collapse in demand for the latter damaged 
demand for the former, hence the trade collapse spread to East Asia through their 
regional production networks. In addition, they were vulnerable to external shock 
because they adopted outward-looking trade policies. 
 
3.2.    Impact on Regional Production Network in Asia 
 
The crisis hit international trade hard, as said earlier. However, world exports in 2010 
(Figure 5) show diversity of regional experiences. While most regions saw a major 
decline in exports after the crisis, Asia and Latin America experienced a relatively quick 
rebound, even surpassing the previous peak of export volumes. It demonstrates that the 
regional production network in East Asia was not derailed.   
 
Why is the export performance of East Asia different from that in other regions? As 
discussed in Kim, Lee, and Park (2010) and Kuroiwa and Ozeki (2010), the major export 
destinations of East Asia are markets of the US and Europe. However, by September 
2010, the US and Europe had not yet made up all the ground lost since the credit crunch 
began, and were not resilient enough to import more from East Asia. Rather, demand 
from emerging economies is helping to reestablish and reoperate East Asia’s regional 
production and trade networks. It is also expected to help advanced countries’ trade 
performance. Therefore, the mutually beneficial trade patterns would be helpful for the 
sustainable growth of the global economy because the growth in one part of the global 
economy can help stimulate a recovery in other part (if countries are successful in 
opening their markets). 
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Note: It was hard to find a dataset showing recent trade performance by region, except the CPB dataset of the 
monthly trade index. However, as CPB’s regional classification does not match the one in this paper, the figure 
reports Asia’s trade performance rather than East Asia’s. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the data of CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (www.cpb.nl). 
 
 
4.    Recent Developments in Trade Systems from the Asian 
Perspective 
 
4.1.    The Global Trade System 
 
Asian economies consider the multilateral trading system the top item on their trade 
policy agenda. In particular, more Asian economies have been participating in the 
system since 2000. The PRC and Taipei,China became members of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 2001, Cambodia and Nepal in 2004, and Viet Nam in 2007. The 
expansion of Asian membership in the WTO is compatible with the growing Asian share 
of global trade. 
 
Even though the current Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations
12 have had 
trouble concluding successfully, the multilateral trading system has played an important 
                                                       
11  The DDA negotiations were launched on November 2001 and the main subjects are agriculture; non-
agricultural market access; services; rules (antidumping, subsidies, and regional trade agreements); 
trade facilitation; trade and development; trade-related intellectual property rights; trade and 
environment; and dispute settlement understanding.  
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role in reducing various barriers to trade and strengthening the rule-based trading 
system. East Asian economies, adopting outward-looking trade policies, have benefited 
greatly. Several studies, such as those by Felbermayr and Kohler (2006), and Liu (2007), 
showed that trade among WTO member countries is higher than when one of the trade 
partners is not a WTO member. While Martin et al. (2008) failed to show that GATT/WTO 
membership alone was significant to the growth of trade, they verified that membership 
in the multilateral trading system was important in promoting trade growth in the Asia–
Pacific region. In addition, Li and Wu (2004) showed that accessions to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/WTO have a positive impact on the productivity of 
acceding economies. These findings underline the importance of the multilateral trading 
system to successful economic and trade performance of East Asia. 
 
In recent years, Asian economies have been involving themselves more in the work of 
the WTO (Figure 6). 
 
 
Figure 6: Regional Trends of Chairpersons of World Trade Organization Bodies 
and Subsidiary Bodies 
 
 
    Source:  World  Trade  Organization  (http://www.wto.org/). 
 
 
East Asian economies have also become much more active in using the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Procedure (DSP) to assert their legal rights, as shown in Ahn (2003) and in 
Figure 7. There were 411 cases under the DSP as of September 2010, with East Asian 
economies involved in 122 cases (61 cases as complainant and 61 cases as 
respondent), representing 30.0% of the total cases. While the main target economies in 
East Asia were the PRC, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, East Asian economies have 
brought trade disputes to the DSP.   
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      Source:  World  Trade  Organization  (http://www.wto.org/). 
 
 
Presumably, East Asia’s use of DSP is based on a belief that the WTO can improve the 
image of globalization, governments of member countries, and the multilateral trading 
system itself—more specifically, that multilateral trade liberalization can serve their 
commercial interests. Most Asian economies’ traditional policy preference for 
multilateralism over regionalism could be another factor. Asian economies have 
expressed their support to the rule-based multilateral trading system and balanced 
outcomes of the DDA under the WTO, especially using the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Summit Meetings,13 even though most Asian countries have 
adopted regional rather than multilateral trade talks since 2000. 
 
In light of what was said above, the DDA negotiations are crucial for East Asian 
economies, even though they have varied positions on each subject. Presumably, any 
multilateral agreement to further reduce barriers to trade will be helpful for countries 
adopting outward-looking trade policies. Particularly, East Asia—having its own regional 
production and trade networks—will secure real benefits from a balanced and ambitious 
conclusion of the negotiations. 
                                                       
12  APEC has 21 members, including 12 in Asia. However, it would be very unlikely for these members to 
declare harmonized views on specific areas of the WTO/DDA negotiations. For example, while APEC 
has countries exporting agricultural goods, such as Thailand, the United States, and Viet Nam, it also 
has countries importing them, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taipei,China, whose 
agriculture sectors are highly sensitive in domestic political terms.    
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4.2    The Regional Trade System 
 
Even though East Asia as a whole does not have any institutional regionalism,
14 many 
of its economies have been actively engaging in bilateral, intraregional, and interregional 
trade agreements with various economies since 2000. Most of its economies have 
multiple regional trade agreements with other economies (Table 3). Singapore is the 
most active regional country in economic integration agreements. The PRC, India, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, and Thailand also have been active in regional trade talks while 
the PRC and Taipei,China signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement in 
June 2010.   
 















PRC  9 1 7  0 
Hong Kong, China  1  0  1  0 
India 12  1  2  0 
Indonesia  7 0 4  0 
Japan 11  0  10  0 
Korea, Republic of  8  1  5  0 
Malaysia  8 0 5  0 
Philippines  8 0 4  0 
Singapore  18 0 15  0 
Taipei,China 3 0 3  0 
Thailand 10  0  6  0 
Viet  Nam  7 0 4  0 
 
Note: EIA = economic integration agreement; PRC = the People’s Republic of China; RTA = regional trade agreement. 
 
Source: World Trade Organization RTA database (http://rtais.wto.org/). 
 
 
This shift from multilateralism to regionalism is based on several factors: fear of being 
left out from the global trend of regionalism; a race to be the “hub” of regionalism in East 
Asia; the strong need for formal cooperation, generated by the crises of the last 15 years. 
Before 2000, there were roughly 75 regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the world, 
except those RTAs currently not effective. Among them, there were only five effective 
regional trade agreements in East Asia: the Protocol on Trade Negotiations (PTN),
15 the 
                                                       
13  Different from institutional (or de jure) integration, East Asia’s economic integration using its regional 
production and trade networks can be called functional, market-driven, or de facto integration. 
14  This Agreement entered into force in 1973 and East Asian countries among the current signatories are  
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Asia–Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA),
16 the Global System of Trade Preferences 
among Developing Countries (GSTP),
17   the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(Lao  PDR)–Thailand Preferential Trading Arrangement,
18 and the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA).
19 However, these RTAs are legally covered by the enabling clause 
under the WTO and their scope of trade liberalization has been negligible. In a practical 
response to the spread of regionalism throughout the world, East Asia decided to 
expand regional integration, hoping to secure foreign markets through RTAs with major 
trading partners, including neighboring countries.   
 
Previous literature on regionalism (De Benedictis et al. 2005; Momani 2007; Park and 
Park 2009) has taken the hub-and-spoke approach to explain the proliferation of 
regionalism. This approach postulates that a large country could be a member of several 
RTAs, but that smaller countries might only belong to one of these RTAs each, implying 
that the large country would then be the hub and the others would form the spokes in a 
series of RTAs. As economies in East Asia started to shift their policy focus from 
multilateralism to regionalism, there has been a race to become the RTA hub in East 
Asia and then economies have more actively participated in regional trade talks. 
 
In addition, disasters and crises, such as the financial crisis in 1997-98, SARS, the 
tsunami, bird flu, and the recent crisis, have exposed the lack of intra-Asian cooperation. 
To redress this lack, East Asian economies have held regional discussions on economic 
integration since 2000. 
 
For instance, there have been 286 regional trade agreements, notified to the WTO as of 
September 2010 (Table 4), and East Asia has participated in 171 such agreements, 
(Table 3 above). From the late 1990s, East Asia began to use FTAs as a trade policy tool 
and now this region is at the forefront of regionalism (Kawai and Wingnaraja 2009b). 
While ASEAN would be the hub of regionalism in East Asia, the race to be the RTA hub 
is not yet over because other regional economies have become more aggressive in 
engaging in regional trade talks. 
 
Still, since East Asia has become a major player in international trade, it is quite 
reasonable for most countries in the world to participate in any regional trade talks and 
channels to cooperate with East Asia. Various bilateral, intraregional, and interregional 
trade talks that include East Asia are under way and this approach is expected to keep 
evolving.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
the Republic of Korea and Philippines. It mainly covers trade in goods. 
15  This Agreement, known as the Bangkok Agreement, came into play in 1976, and the current signatories 
are Bangladesh, the PRC, India, the Republic of Korea, Lao PDR, and Sri Lanka. It mainly covers trade 
in goods. 
16  This Agreement became effective in 1989 and East Asian countries among the current signatories are 
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. It mainly 
covers trade in goods. 
17  This bilateral PTA between the Lao PDR and Thailand entered into force in 1991 and covers mainly 
trade in goods. 
18  This Agreement entered into force in 1992 and all ASEAN members signed this Agreement. It covers 
trade in goods.  
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Table 4: All Regional Trade Agreements in Force (by World Trade Organization 
Legal Coverage, September 2010) 
 
 Accessions  New  RTAs  Total 
GATT Art. XXIV (FTA)  2  156  158 
GATT Art. XXIV (CU)  6  9  15 
Enabling Clause  1  30  31 
GATS Art. V  3  79  82 
Total 12  274  286 
 
Note: CU = customs union; FTA = free trade agreement; GATT = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
 
Source: World Trade Organization RTA database (http://rtais.wto.org/). 
 
East Asia must overcome several challenges in the near future. The first is how to 
improve companies’ utilization of RTAs, as discussed in Kawai and Wignaraja (2009b) 
and Baldwin (2006). Various surveys, such as Kawai and Wignaraja (2009a), report that 
RTAs are underused in East Asia, even though companies are supposed to fully use 
RTA preferences. (After conducting more in-depth studies on this issue, scholars can 
provide policy implications for East Asian economies.)   
 
In addition, compared with the other regions in the triad, East Asian regionalism is 
relatively shallow, with relatively low coverage of products and services but wide 
exceptions for sensitive products and sectors. Another challenge is, therefore, how to 
promote comprehensive trade coverage in goods and services. Other challenges must 
also be resolved, such as multiple rules of origin, generating spaghetti bowl effects;
 20 




5.   Policy  Recommendation  from the Asian Perspective 
 
World trade has been hit hard by the recent global crisis, as discussed. In particular, the 
emerging Asian economies that depend heavily on trade as their growth engine saw a 
severe drop in their exports in 2009. Fortunately, the world economy since the beginning 
of 2010 has shown a modest-paced, yet noticeable recovery, which in turn has been 
followed by an improvement in the world trading environment. Despite such signs, it is 
still too early to proclaim the crisis fully over; in fact, there are many obstacles for the 
world economy to overcome if it is to see robust growth.   
 
Since their inception in November 2008, G20 summit meetings have provided a forum 
for world leaders to discuss key issues, allowing a concerted effort to overcome the 
crisis. Their evaluation is relatively positive. Specifically, their contribution in proposing 
                                                       
19  This term is used by Professor Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University to describe the complexity of 
trade rules resulting from a proliferation of RTAs.  
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policies to prevent the crisis from spiraling out of control to become another Great 
Depression received much international support. However, despite discussions on 
policies to overcome the crisis, on financial-regulation reform, and on reforms of 
international financial institutions that have led to substantial progress, the Summits have 
not been able to produce binding outcomes on politically sensitive issues such as IMF 
quota adjustments and governance reforms. For that reason, at the Seoul Summit, 
countries focused on attaining tangible results on unconcluded items on the agenda. (As 
the host, the Republic of Korea added a global financial safety net as well as 
development issues to the agenda.)   
 
On the trade front, since the first Washington Summit, G20 leaders have voiced a unified 
concern of the global financial crisis reverting world trade to protectionism, and 
subsequently agreed to a standstill on trade restriction measures. With regard to 
enforcement, it was agreed that the WTO, OECD, and UNCTAD would lead monitoring 
efforts and report to the G20 summit meeting on the status. Some scholars are 
attributing the absence of a substantial increase in protectionist trade measures to this 
commitment. However, as most G20 countries are resorting to trade remedies such as 
anti-dumping duties, the concern for increased protectionism still lingers. At the Toronto 
Summit, the OECD, International Labour Organization, World Bank, and WTO assumed 
responsibility to study the effect that trade liberalization will have on employment and 
growth, and report the results at Seoul.   
 
However, the stalemate in the WTO DDA negotiations presents a challenge to the 
credibility of the G20 as an international governance vehicle; despite being on every 
Declaration of the G20 summit meetings (Table 5), the DDA negotiations have shown no 
substantial progress. (They are the first multilateral trade negotiations launched by the 
WTO since its inception in the mid-1990s. The official negotiations began in 2001 and 
were originally scheduled to be completed by 2004.) A bigger worry is that it is uncertain 
when, or whether, they will be concluded at all. From the perspective of global 
governance, a crisis of multilateral trading system epitomized by the WTO system in a 
sense preceded the recent crisis.   
 
Compared with the active discussions on reforms in international financial institutions 
conducted by G20 leaders recently, the effort the G20 is making in strengthening the 
multilateral trading system through concluding the Doha Round seems insufficient. More 
disconcerting is a growing opposition to the G20 involvement in DDA discussions based 
on a concern that G20’s continuing issuance of unrealistic promises (such as the early 
conclusion of the Doha Round) will only damage the credibility of the G20 summit 
system.  
 
However, this criticism fails to see the full picture of the DDA negotiations and the 
implications for the future of the G20 summit system. The fundamental reason why there 
is no conclusion of the DDA negotiations is that there is no agreement on the major 
issues; and the main reason why there is no agreement on the major issues is the 
disputes among key players, which are core members of the G20. Hence, if the G20 
countries avoid the issue of stalemate in the DDA negotiations, at base caused by their 
disagreements for political reasons, that in and of itself will seriously hurt the credibility of 
the G20 summit as the premier forum for international economic cooperation.  
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- Refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, 
imposing new export restrictions, or implementing WTO-inconsistent measures to 
stimulate exports. 
- Strive to reach agreement on modalities that leads to a successful conclusion to 
the WTO’s DDA with an ambitious and balanced outcome. 
London, 
United Kingdom 
- Reaffirm the commitment made in Washington. 
- Notify promptly the WTO of any such measures. 
- Take whatever steps possible to promote and facilitate trade and investment. 




- Remain committed to further trade liberalization. 
- Seek an ambitious and balanced conclusion to the DDA in 2010. 
Toronto, 
Canada 
- Renew for a further 3 years, until the end of 2013, commitment to refrain from 
raising barriers or imposing new barriers. 
- Reiterate support for bringing the DDA to a balanced and ambitious conclusion. 
- Commit to maintain momentum for aid for trade. 
Seoul, Republic 
of Korea 
- Re-emphasize the need to promptly conclude the DDA. 
- Remain committed to the aid for trade levels beyond 2011. 
- Make progress toward duty-free quota-free market access for least-developed 
country products 
- Coordinate a collective multilateral response to support trade facilitation. 
- Support measures to increase the availability of trade finance in developing 
countries. 
 
Note: DDA = Doha Development Agenda; WTO = World Trade Organization. 
Sources: Summit declarations. 
 
Leaders at Seoul re-emphasized the need to promptly conclude the DDA negotiations 
(Table 5). They suggested that 2011 is a critical window of opportunity. Again, they did 
not discuss specific issues to resolve the disputes among key participants but simply 
directed negotiators to engage in across-the-board negotiations. However, without 
compromises among political leaders, negotiators cannot make any breakthrough. This 
aspect is similar to that found in all previous G20 summit declarations. One positive note 
from Seoul is that leaders showed their commitment to make progress toward duty-free 
quota-free market access for least-developed country products (Table 5). 
 
Nevertheless, there is a limit to the impact that multilateral trade negotiations under the 
WTO can have on global trade liberalization. First, they are a compromise among more 
than 150 countries; therefore, the depth of the consequent trade liberalization can only 
be limited. The G20 leaders recognize the importance of regional integration by  
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advancing a commitment in the Seoul Summit Document to support “the regional 
integration efforts of African leaders, including by helping to realize their vision of a free 
trade area through the promotion of trade facilitation and regional infrastructure.”
21 If the 
multilateral trading system represented by a robust WTO loses its footing in the world 
economy, the global trade system will be replaced by regional trade blocs. RTAs have 
their roots in trade liberalization; however, their negative consequences, such as trade 
diversion effects and increased maintenance and harmonization costs, preclude their 
replacing multilateral trading system. From the perspective of global governance, this is 
why the G20 leaders must strengthen the multilateral trading system under the WTO. In 
order to find the “framework of strong, sustainable and balanced growth” proposed at 
Pittsburg, the role of international trade is even more important.   
 
Considering that international trade can create jobs and assist economic growth of 
developing countries despite the recent global crisis, the DDA negotiations must be 
concluded as soon as possible. That may boost the world’s confidence in the multilateral 
trading system. And such strengthening of the system will be very important for 
emerging Asian economies. However, concluding them by the end of 2011 looks very 
slim (despite the Seoul Summit commitment to do that). In fact, some experts advocate 
a discussion of exit strategies from the DDA negotiations, deeming them a failure. Hence, 
the negotiations must fight against time as well. The G20 leaders must consider, on the 
one hand, costs incurred by the failure of the negotiations and, on the other, results of 
less than optimal, but binding, negotiations, and evaluate which will be more compatible 
with the sustainable and balanced growth the world is striving for. What must be 
stressed again is the need for a tangible solution that is legally binding along with an 
action plan to implement such solution.   
 
In addition, the G20 leaders should voice their concern over the continuous upward 
trend of RTAs. Moreover, several bilateral FTAs should be integrated into multilateral 
RTAs, and it should be stressed by the G20 leaders that such RTAs must meet the 
requirements put forth by the WTO. Particularly, the RTAs in the Asian region have 
spread at an accelerated rate recently. Already, the PRC, Japan and the Republic of 
Korea have each agreed on FTAs not only with ASEAN, but also with many individual 
ASEAN members. For example, the Republic of Korea and the PRC recently started FTA 
discussions at the government level, and the Republic of Korea and Japan are now 
discussing the resumption of their bilateral FTA talks that halted in late 2004. Moreover, 
at the PRC-Japan-[Republic of] Korea summit meeting of October 2009, the heads of 
state agreed to pursue studies regarding a possible trilateral FTA. Even though 
regionalism took hold of Asia much later than it did other regions, too many separate 
bilateral FTAs among Asian economies constitute a suboptimal approach.   
 
On that note, as participants in the G20 summit, these three countries must consider 
possibilities of integrating individual bilateral FTAs not only in Northeast Asia, but also in 
East Asia more widely, into broader RTAs. There are a few options of RTAs that be 
nurtured in the region of Northeast Asia and East Asia that the PRC, Japan, and the 
Republic of Korea can all participate in: APEC evolving into an RTA; a Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP); an East Asian FTA; and a PRC-Japan-[Republic of] Korea (CJK) FTA. 
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None of the four options has yet seen visible progress, except for the last one (as 
discussed in the previous paragraph). In this regard, anticipation of a Northeast Asian 
FTA will rise until reaching its climax at the end of 2012, when the above studies on a 
possible CJK FTA is completed. The studies’ evaluation of a Northeast Asian FTA will 
likely be more positive and deem it more efficient than separate bilateral FTAs among 
the three countries.   
 
If the CJK FTA negotiations are initiated, the quality of the FTA will receive much critical 
attention; in fact, the heads of the three states may be well advised to proclaim that a 
prospective trilateral FTA should be a high-quality, comprehensive FTA that meets and 
even goes beyond WTO requirements. If not, CJK FTA will not contribute much to global 
trade liberalization.   
 
If CJK FTA is agreed on, the next step would be a CJK + ASEAN FTA. This is because, 
as said, all three countries already have separate FTAs with ASEAN and therefore the 
addition of ASEAN into a CJK framework will not be too arduous or costly. If the CJK + 
ASEAN FTA—or East Asian FTA—is signed, leaders need to recognize the importance 
of keeping it inclusive: more precisely, the East Asian FTA must keep its membership 
open to any interested party, and countries such as Australia, India, and New Zealand 
should be free to join.   
 
Considering that numerous development projects have been attempted and have 
consumed vast resources, and that they have not produced as much success as hoped 
for, the G20 Seoul Summit looked to link development with other important issues on the 
agenda. The government of the Republic of Korea explained that the focus was the 
advancement of developing countries’ capabilities. It also stressed that the projects born 
out of this discussion would be multiyear rather than one-time projects, and emphasized 
that this approach is different from that in the past. However, to achieve maximum 
returns from the limited given resources, development partners must select and focus.   
 
Reflecting on economic development lessons that trade plays a critical role in lifting 
developing economies, the summit considered linking development with trade. To be 
precise, trade was already included in the development agenda, since other items such 
as infrastructure, human resource development, private investment, and job creation, if 
discussed with a focus on the linkage between them and trade, would benefit developing 
countries and their efforts to develop even further.   
 
The Seoul Summit dealt with aid for trade in a more comprehensive manner than the 
previous summit meetings. It presented an explicit commitment by G20 countries of “at 
least maintaining, beyond 2011, aid for trade levels that reflect the average of the last 
three years (2006 to 2008)”—a substantial development from the vague commitment 
made at Toronto (Table 5). But in order to take on such challenge, there must first be a 
better understanding and a more critical evaluation of the nature and consequences thus 
far of aid for trade projects. The G20 leaders also noted this necessity in the Multi-Year 
Action Plan on Development by linking further efforts to collaborate among international 
organizations to deliver aid for trade with the outcomes of the Global Aid for Trade 
Review of July 2011, which is being conducted jointly by the OECD and WTO. In 
addition, the Summit advanced new commitments in duty-free quota-free market access  
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for least-developed countries, coordination of a collective multilateral response to 
support trade facilitation, and support of measures to increase the availability of trade 
finance in developing countries. These results committed in the Multi-Year Action Plan 
on Development from the Seoul Summit should result in practical long-term results 
geared toward trade promotion and facilitation.   
 
From the perspective of global governance, the G20 leaders should continue their 
utmost efforts to settle the DDA negotiations by the end of 2011. Such a feat will 
ultimately serve to enhance the reputation and credibility of the G20 summit as the 
premier forum for international economic cooperation. Furthermore, the G20 leaders 
must express their concerns for an undeniable encroachment of regionalism. Related to 
this point, leaders of the PRC, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and ASEAN should attempt 
to consolidate and multilateralize the numerous individual bilateral FTAs that are being 
concluded in Northeast and East Asia into a broader RTA that liberalizes a larger area of 
the region. They should also ensure that this “East Asian RTA” is a high-quality and 
comprehensive RTA, meeting the WTO requirements. The Multi-Year Action Plan on 
Development produced at Seoul should be faithfully implemented. This will contribute to 
capacity building of developing countries, promoting their economic growth.    
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